Many models of classical conditioning fail to describe important phenomena, notably the rapid return of fear after extinction. To address this shortfall, evidence converged on the idea that learning agents rely on latent-state inferences, i.e. an ability to index disparate associations from cues to rewards (or penalties) and infer which index (i.e. latent state) is presently active. Our goal was to develop a model of latent-state inferences that uses latent states to predict rewards from cues efficiently and that can describe behavior in a diverse set of experiments. The resulting model combines a Rescorla-Wagner rule, for which updates to associations are proportional to prediction error, with an approximate Bayesian rule, for which beliefs in latent states are proportional to prior beliefs and an approximate likelihood based on current associations. In simulation, we demonstrate the model's ability to reproduce learning effects both famously explained and not explained by the Rescorla-Wagner model, including rapid return of fear after extinction, the Hall-Pearce effect, partial reinforcement extinction effect, backwards blocking, and memory modification. Lastly, we derive our model as an online algorithm to maximum likelihood estimation, demonstrating it is an efficient approach to outcome prediction. Establishing such a framework is a key step towards quantifying normative and pathological ranges of latent-state inferences in various contexts.
Associative strengths
A learning agent's world view whereby rewards are generated according to cues, a latent state, and a latent error. In order to predict rewards, they must infer which latent state is active, the relationship between cues and rewards for each latent state, and the expected uncertainty in rewards due to the latent error. B) The proposed model for how a learning agent inverts their world view. They first observe cues to generate expectations or predictions for rewards based on L estimates of associative strengths corresponding to L latent states. Upon observing rewards, they use errors in their predictions to update associative strengths, measures of uncertainty, and beliefs in which state is active. The degree to which associative strengths can be updated depends on both the agent's belief in the corresponding latent state and the corresponding effort matrix, which keeps track of how cues covary. This relationship is captured by an associative strength for each cue updated according to:
if c n (t) = 0, with initial associative strength V n (1) = 0. Term α n (t) is referred to as associability and is constant in the RW model. Collecting associative strengths in a vector V (t), we can express this update concisely as V (t + 1) = V (t) + A(t) c(t) R(t) − c(t) V (t) .
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The term A(t) is now a matrix capturing associability. The RW model assumes A(t) is diagonal with terms 89 α n (t) along its diagonal, whereas we will consider matrices that are not diagonal. Changes in associative 90 strength depends on the learning agent's current expectation or best guess c(t) V (t) for rewards given 91 observed cues. If their expectation exceeds the actual reward, then associative strength declines for each cue 92 present. If their expectation is below the actual reward, then associative strength increases for each cue 93 present. By updating associative strength in vector form, we see that rewards are captured by a linear 94 regression model of cues. Hence, cues can be continuous or represent interactions, i.e. the presence or 95 absence of a compound of cues. That is, the same update formula applies for continuous cues and interaction 96
terms. Also note that the RW model learns cue-reward associations rather than action-value associations as 97 in temporal difference reinforcement learning. 98 Allowing for latent-state learning 99 We build upon the RW model by allowing a learning agent to propose L competing (i.e. mutually-exclusive) 100
associations between cues and rewards. The index to each association is referred to as a latent state and is 101 associated with its own RW model for predicting rewards from cues. The agent learns about associations for 102 each latent state while learning about their belief in which latent state best explains current observations. 103 We capture belief in latent state l on trial t as a positive variable p l (t) such that beliefs sum to one: 104 p 1 (t) + . . . + p L (t) = 1. 105 We let V l (t) represent the vector of associative strengths and A l (t) represent the associability matrix for latent state l. The learning agent updates associative strength as before except for the subscript l:
where we used the shortened notation E l (t) to represent the prediction error for latent state l on trial t:
depends on the history of observations and changes over time [10] . We describe associability as depending on current beliefs and a matrix B l (t) which we refer to as an effort matrix:
for a patent-specific parameter α 0 ∈ [0, 1] controlling how much an individual weights older observations versus newer observations. The effort matrix B l (t) is updated according to B l (t + 1) = B(t) + α 0 (p l (t) c(t) c(t) − B(t)) .
with B l (1) = I. The effort matrix estimates the matrix of cue second moments associated with each latent 108 state. Second moment information of cues has been integrated into other models of learning, but usually in 109 the form of variances and covariances rather than second moments directly [11, 19] . The use of the effort 110 matrix is motivated in our derivation of our model in the Methods section and is similar to matrices found in 111 an online algorithm for solving the machine learning problem of contextual bandits with linear rewards [25] .
112
Updating latent-state beliefs 113 Beliefs link latent states in our model. The assumed world view of the learning agent proposes that rewards are generated on trial t as follows: a latent random variable X(t) ∈ {1, . . . , L} is drawn from some distribution and rewards are drawn depending on the current latent state X(t) and cues c(t) ( Fig 1A) .
Further, rewards are assumed to be mutually independent between trials conditional on latent states, and latent states are assumed to be Markovian, i.e. X(t) depends on X(1:t − 1) only through X(t − 1). Under these assumptions, Bayes law yields a posterior distribution over latent states from observed rewards given by: where we suppress the dependence on cue vectors to shorten notation. The posterior probability ρ l (t) that latent state X(t) is l based on observations up to trial t is then:
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From this expression, we see that optimal Bayesian inference requires enumerating over all possible sequences 114 of latent states, the number of which grows exponentially with t. Such computation is generally considered 115 optimistic for human computation [26] . Efforts are made to reduce computation such as with particle 116 methods [17] , assuming one transition between states [27] , or using a functional form of memory that does 117 not maintain the entire history of observations.
118
We capture a more general dynamic learning environment similar to [26] , by assuming latent states are a Markov chain in which a latent variable transitions to itself from one trial to the next with probability 1 − γ(L − 1)/L and transitions to a new state (all new states being equally-likely) with probability γ(L − 1)/L. This assumption reflects that learning often involve blocks of consecutive trials, or stages, in which rewards are generated in an identical manner. An optimal Bayesian filtering equation could then be used to update beliefs
Unfortunately, this equation requires the learning agent knows the probability distribution of rewards for each latent state. We thus do not think the agent reasons in an optimal Bayesian way. Instead, we initialize beliefs p l (0) = 1/L and propose that the agent uses an approximate Bayesian filtering equation (cf. [28] )
where φ is the probability density function of a standard normal random variable; σ(t) is the agent's estimate of the standard deviation of rewards at the start of trial t; and
is a normalizing constant to ensure beliefs sum to 1. In other words, we replace the distribution/density 119 function of rewards in the optimal Bayesian filtering equation with a normal density function with mean 120 given by the agent's current estimate c l (t) V l (t) and standard deviation given by the agent's current estimate 121 σ(t). Even though we use a normal density function, rewards do not need to be normally-distributed or even 122 continuous. 123 
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Measuring expected uncertainty 124 The learning agent may also track the standard deviation σ(t) of prediction errors. With only one standard deviation, we assume the learning agent estimates the standard deviation pooled over each latent state. We use pooled estimates to reduce the number of variables, but it may be more realistic to use a separate estimate for each latent state. We use the following update:
where σ 2 (1) = σ 2 0 is some initial estimate of the variance; β 0 is a constant associability parameter for variance σ 2 (t); and E 2 (t) is the squared prediction error averaged over latent states:
Variance is also used in other models of latent-state learning, such as the model in Redish et al [11] and the 125 model in Gershman et al [19] . Further, Yu and Dayan [26] proposed a neural mechanism, via acetylcholine 126 signalling, by which a learning agent keeps track of expected uncertainty in changing environments. As a 127 staple to statistical inference, variance is a natural candidate for quantifying expected uncertainty.
128
Measuring unexpected uncertainty 129 Many latent-state learning models assume the number of latent state can grow [11, 15, 17] . Similarly, we use an online mechanism to trigger an addition of new latent states when needed to explain rewards. This mechanism reflects the need to capture unexpected uncertainty, as discussed in Yu an Dayan [26] . It is based on Page's algorithm [29] for solving a problem known as change point detection (cf. [30] ). The idea is to test whether we can reject our current model in favor of an alternative model with an extra latent state.
Specifically, we let L be the number of latent states actively considered on trial t. We keep track of model performance using a statistic q(t):
with a scalar parameter δ and initialized q(1) = 0. Importantly, φ (0) /l 0 is the likelihood ratio between a one-state model with expected rewards given by actual rewards R(t) and the current model, where l 0 was the 9/41 normalizing constant for beliefs at Eq (6) . If q(t) exceeds a threshold η, we let
Note that c(t) V L+1 (t) = R(t) so that the current reward is the expected reward for the new state. We then 130
replace L with L + 1. Context changes are believed to influence learning in a distinctly different way than a cue influences learning [12] . Our model supposes that these changes in context corrodes current beliefs, whereby beliefs in a latent state on a previous trial are thought to be less informative on the present trial. For a temporal shift in context, our model supposes this corrosion increases with time. While the Gershman (2017) model uses a temporal kernel, we replace beliefs p l (t) at the end of trial t with
where IT I is the time between trials within a task phase. This update amounts to repeatedly updating states are believed to be equally likely. As a result, an agent does not carry their beliefs forward to the next 138 trial when there is a spatial or visual change of context.
139
A temporal shift in context might also alter how associative strengths and beliefs are updated. Gershman 140 et al [19] describes the influence of retrieval on a memory by way of "rumination". This mechanism is 141 captured in the model of Gershman (2017) [19] and in our model by repeatedly replacing associative 142 strengths V l (t) with the new estimate V l (t + 1) performing the updates at the end of trial t again. This process is repeated for a number of trials given by min{χ, IT I − 1} where χ is a patient-specific parameter. 144
Putting it all together
Our latent-state model of learning is summarized in Fig 1B and for contextual shifts whether they be visual, spatial, or temporal. Further, parameters can be tuned to 150 describe differences in learning between agents: α 0 influences the rate of learning associative strengths, β 0 151 influences the rate of learning variance, γ influences transitions between latent state, σ 0 influences initial 152 expected uncertainty, ν and δ influence unexpected uncertainty, and χ determines rumination.
153
Our model is grounded by six major predictions or assumptions about how an agent learns: variables [8, 11, 17, 19] . 160 2) An agent uses latent states to predict rewards. In deriving our model (see Methods section), 161 we start with the assumption that the agent's goal is to predict rewards. The role of a latent state is to 162 account for different predictions that can be made upon observing cues. By contrast, the role of a latent 163 state could be to discriminate between different sets of cues-reward observations [11, 17] , which in turn could 164 be used to predict rewards. slowly for latent states believed to be inactive. This feature is similar to the Mackintosh model [31] in that 168 associability increases when rewards are accurately predicted. However, associative strength also updates 169 quickly when an agent switches their belief to a new latent state to account for unexpected or surprising 170 outcomes, i.e. outcomes in which prediction error is larger relative to the expected uncertainty. This feature 171 is similar to Pearce-Hall model [9] , which supposes associability increases in the presence of uncertainty.
appear (off-diagonal entries), also determines associability. As a result, associative strength is updated more 174 quickly when novel sets of cues are presented. agent is able to believe that two latent states are equally likely. This allows the agent to explicitly state their 185 beliefs in competing associations, as is required by some learning tasks [32] . Maintaining beliefs over multiple 186
states is a common feature for Bayesian models [17, 19, 27, 32 ]. An alternative is to classify each trial to one 187 state [11, 33] . [11] , the infinite-mixture model of Gershman and Niv in [17] , and the Gershman (2017) model in [19]. 194 Other model comparisons are considered in S1 Text and S1-2 Figures. For each model, we computed 195 associative strength per cue and belief in each latent state. For our model, the infinite-mixture model, and 196
13/41

Experiment
Observed effect
Blocking [35] Associative strength of a neutral cue is blocked when reinforced with a cue already associated with the reward Overexpectation [36] Associative strength of two cues weakens when these cues are reinforced together after reinforcing each cue separately Conditioned inhibition [37] A cue can inhibit responding to a reward after alternating between reinforcing a separate cue and presenting both cues with a weaker reward or no reward. Wilson et al (1992) [38] Associative strength of a cue increases more when the cue is a less accurate predictor of a reward (also known as the Hall-Pearce effect [24] ) Rescorla (2000) [39] Changes in associative strength can be greater for one cue over another when presented at the same time Partial reinforcement [40] [41] [42] Associative strength of a cue is slower to extinguish after partial reinforcement compared to continuous reinforcement (also known as the partial reinforcement extinction effect) Backwards blocking [43] Associative strength of a cue weakens when a separate cue is reinforced after reinforcing both cues together Rapid return of fear & renewal [12] Associative strength of cue returns quickly after extinction, particularly when extinction is associated with a different context Spontaneous recovery [12] Associative strength of a cue returns more greatly after extinction with a longer interval between extinction and renewal Memory modification [44, 45] Associative strength of a cue to a fearful outcome can be weakened if extinction occurs within a certain time window following a single retrieval trial Table 1 . Simulated experiments and group-level effect observed in each experiment. Models were evaluated based on its ability to reproduce the observed effect for each simulated experiment. Blocking and other effects 205 We first tested whether our model could reproduce learning effects that established the RW model as a 206 powerful model of associative learning (Fig 2) . In a blocking experiment, for instance, a learning agent is 207 conditioned to associate a cue (Cue A) with a reward, leading to a high associative strength for Cue A. whereas the fRL+decay model decays associative strength of cues that are not presented, leading to different 228 predictions for blocking, overexpectation, or conditioned inhibition experiments.
229
Learning effects not explained by the RW model 230 We also tested whether our latent-state learning model could reproduce historically-important learning 231 effects not predicted by the RW model due to its assumption of constant associability (Fig 2) . associative strength of the tone decays less in Group E because it is presented more often, which is 255 compensated by an increase in the associative strength of the light.
256
Other learning effects can also be similarly explained by our model as a shift in latent-state beliefs (Fig 4) . 257
Experiments 1A-B in [39] 
269
The partial extinction learning effect (PREE) is also similarly explained by our model as a shift in 270 latent-state beliefs ( Fig 5) . Partial reinforcement involves alternating between reinforcing and not reinforcing 271 a cue. It was found that a response was harder to extinguish after partial reinforcement compared to 272 continuous reinforcement [40] . Our model explains that an agent is better able to discriminate between 273 reinforcement and extinction with a continuous reinforcement schedule. This allows the agent to switch their 274 beliefs to a new latent state and thus experience faster extinction. PREE was also observed even if 275 continuous reinforcement was administered in between partial reinforcement and extinction [41, 42] . Rescorla (2000) [39] . In both experiments, Rescorla concluded that associative strength increased more for Cue B relative to Cue A when presented together based on compound tests that showed greater responding in the compound with the Cue B than the compound with Cue A. This result suggested that associability can differ between cues even when presented together. [39] . The RW model does not capture these effects since associability is constant whereas our model captures these effects because latent-state beliefs alters associability. Beliefs in the first latent state (black solid lines) and the second latent state (black dashed lines) are shown for models with latent states. Gray dashed lines demarcate experimental stages.
Associability depends on history of cue presentation 282
Our model encodes the history of cue presentation in effort matrices B l (t), endowing associability in our 283 model with unique properties. One example is backwards blocking (Fig 6) . A compound of two cues (Cues A 284 [41] demonstrating that the associative strength of a cue is harder to extinguish after partial reinforcement (Group 20P) compared to continuous reinforcement (Group 20R). Reprinted from "Resistance to extinction when partial reinforcement is followed by regular reinforcement" by H.M. Jenkins, 1962, Journal of Experimental Psychology, 64, p. 443. Reprinted with permission from the American Psychological Association. B) Simulation of partial reinforcement effect (Experiment 1). This effect is observed even when partial reinforcement is followed by continuous reinforcement prior to extinction (Experiment 2). Our model captures these effects, because an agent is better able to discriminate between reinforcement and extinction with a continuous reinforcement schedule. The agent can thus shift their beliefs to a new latent state in order to build new associations for extinction. Beliefs in the first latent state are shown for models with latent states. Gray dashed lines demarcate experimental stages. and X) is reinforced with a reward followed by only one of the cues (Cue X) being reinforced. In the second 285 part, Cue A gains associative strength while Cue X loses associative strength even though it is not presented. 286
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The RW model cannot explain backwards blocking, because a cue must be present to change its associative 287 strength. The infinite-mixture and the Gershman (2017) model also did not capture backwards blocking. By 288 20/41 contrast, the associative strength of Cue X correctly decreased in the second part for our latent-state model. 289
Our latent-state model first learns the compound predicts a reward. Without additional information, it splits 290 associative strength equally between the two cues. Later, our latent-state model learns Cue A predicts 291 rewards. Reconciling both parts, our latent-state model increases the associative strength of Cue A while 292 decreasing the associative strength of Cue X. In other words, our latent-state model learns about the 293 difference in associative strengths between Cues A and X. Mathematically, applying the inverse of B l (t) to 294 the cue vector c(t) rotates the cue vector from being in the direction of Cue A to be in the direction of Cue A 295 minus Cue X. Only the fRL+decay model was also able to reproduce backwards blocking, but provided an 296 alternative explanation: associative strength decays for any cue that is absent, such as Cue X in Stage 2 of 297 this experiment. 
298
Backwards blocking
Learning with latent-states 299
To complete our simulation study, we tested if our latent-state model could describe more recent experiments 300 that examine latent-state learning. 301 
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Renewal Latent-state learning was offered as an explanation of renewal of expectations after extinction and the role 303 that context plays in this renewal [11, 12, 15, 16] . We simulated renewal wherein a cue is reinforced, 304 extinguished, and then reinforced (Fig 7) . Two experimental conditions are considered: one in which the 305 same visual/spatial context is provided through each phase and another in which a different visual/spatial 306 context is provided during the extinction phase. Following prior models [8, 11, 17, 19] example, expected rewards are given on each trial to account for the contribution of both the cue and the 313 context rather than associative strength which only accounts for the contribution of the cue.
314
In both experimental conditions, our latent-state learner slowly detects the shift when arm-reward 315 contingencies first shift and switches their beliefs to a new latent state, effectively consolidating the memory 316 of the first task phase. By detecting this shift, the agent can both construct new associative strengths for 317 each arm and preserve the old associative strengths that were accurate for the first block of trials. These The infinite-mixture model predicts that the learning agent switches beliefs in a new latent state only when a 324 different context is introduced otherwise using one latent state to predict all phases of the task. For the given 325 9, p. 252 . Reprinted with permission from the American Psychological Association. C) Simulation results of expected rewards when a response is reinstated after extinction with and without a change in a visual/spatial context. The second experiment examines associative strength of cue when a response is reinstated after extinction with and without a change in a temporal context (i.e. a time delay between trials). Our model shows a rapid reinstatement of expectations as the agent switch their beliefs back to the first latent state. Our model also shows that rapid reinstatement is more robust with changes in context, particular in the first few trials of reinstatement. Expected rewards are depicted rather than associative strengths to account for the influence of context on expectations in addition to the cue, since models other than our model treat context as an additional cue. Beliefs are shown for the first latent state. Gray dashed lines demarcate experimental stages. reinstatement (Fig 8) . For example, spontaneous recovery is a learning effect wherein the associative strength 332 of a cue is reinstated more strongly after a time delay between extinction and renewal [12] . We simulated 333 spontaneous recovery using the same schedule as renewal, but adding a time delay between extinction and 334 23/41 renewal. Our model accounts for time delays by shifting beliefs towards uniform beliefs over latent states.
Uniform beliefs reflects that beliefs from a prior trial is less informative on a trial when there is a time delay 336 between trials. As a result, a time delay causes the associative strength of the cue predicted by our model to 337 be about half the associative strength at the end of its initial acquisition (first latent state) and at the end of 338 extinction (second latent state). Without the time delay, the associative strength predicted by our model is 339 simply the associative strength at the end of extinction. Only the Gershman (2017) model adjusts its 340 prediction for context changes due to temporal shifts, but does not capture a more robust return of 341 associative strength due to a temporal shift. The other models also do not capture this more robust return. 342
Memory modification 343
Our last simulation experiment explores the potential role of latent-state learning in memory modification. 344 Monfils et al [44] in a rodent model and later Schiller et al [45] in humans showed that a single retrieval trial 345 between acquisition and extinction can reduce the fear response to the cue in latter tests. The time between 346 retrieval and extinction was further shown to modify this effect. Only certain windows of times reduced the 347 fear response. They proposed that the retrieval trial helped to reconsolidate the acquisition memory to be 348 less fearful within this reconsolidation window. The Gershman (2017) model [19] includes a computational 349 explanation of this phenomenon. With a similar Bayesian framework to the Gershman (2017) model, our 350 model included similar memory modifications. 351 We simulated the Monfils-Schiller experiment in [19] , varying the time between retrieval and extinction 352 (Fig 9) . Our model reproduces a qualitatively similar result as the Gershman (2017) 
Overview of simulation results
363
Our model reproduced group-level effects from a series of classical experiments. [38] and Rescorla (2000) [39] , and experiments involving 369
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Gershman (2017)
Our model Target effect
Certain delays between a single retrieval trial and extinction can weaken associative strength and together with rumination steps, allows our model to reproduce memory consolidation experiments [44, 45] . 375 Finally, our model uses interaction terms and centers rewards, which we found were important for explaining 376 certain group-level effects by determining whether a learning agent would shift to a new latent state. 377 Table 2 . Models were assessed based on whether or not they could reproduce the observed effect for each simulated experiment (yes=or no=), with observed effects defined in Table 1 . It is important to note, however, that this assessment does not account for the magnitude of the effect or whether a different set of parameters could reproduce the effect.
Monfils-Schiller Experiment
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Discussion
378
We presented a computational model of latent-state learning, using the Rescorla-Wagner (RW) model as its conditioning to more recent experiments on latent-state inferences. We show that most features fall-out 391 naturally when trying to develop an online approach to reward prediction which uses latent-state inferences. 392
Other models of latent-state learning share some, but not all these features [11, 17, 19] .
393
For example, our model assumes a learning agent uses latent states to index disparate associations, or 394 mappings, from cues to rewards in an effort to predict cues. By contrast, the Redish (2007) [27] and Experiments 1A-B in Rescorla (2000) [39] .
417
Similar to other latent-state models, our model also assumes an agent who learns online. Online learning 418 requires only current observations rather than the entire history of observations to update parameters and 419 quantities such as associative strength. Consequently, online approaches have computational and memory 420 requirements that grow in the number of latent states rather than in trials, which could be a more realistic 421 reflection of how humans learn. The infinite-mixture model also uses online updates for all its variables [17] , 422
whereas the Gershman (2017) model and Redish model (2007) uses online updates for most variables [11, 19] . 423
For comparison, an optimal Bayesian approach to latent-state learning would require enumerating over all 
Mathematical justification 488
We justify our choice of model under the premise of computational rationality [52] , i.e. a learning agent wants to predict rewards efficiently. An optimistic strategy for the learning agent would be to use maximize likelihood estimation (MLE) to aid prediction. This would entail starting with a probabilistic model of rewards defined up to an unknown parameter θ and finding θ to maximize the log-likelihood of rewards (scaled by 1/t):
Treating rewards as a continuous variable, we use f to denote a probability density function. 
where c(t) is the cue vector on trial t (independent variables); µ are unknown parameters (unknown 494 regression coefficients); and (t) is an independent Gaussian random variable (error) with mean zero and 495 unknown variance ν. Unknown parameters are collected in θ = µ ν .
496
Although we could maximize directly, we want an online approach to maximization and instead consider applying Newton's method for optimization (i.e., gradient descent), which involves repeatedly updating an estimateθ of θ with a new estimate of the form:
for some learning rate λ(t) and an appropriate matrix H(t). Matrix H(t) can take many forms and is important for determining how quickly estimates converge to a maximum/minimum. An ideal choice is the Hessian resulting in the Newton-Raphson method, but the Hessian is often noninvertible in MLE. A common alternative is the negative of the Fisher information matrix I(θ) scaled by 1/t and evaluated at the current estimate [50] . Even with Newton's method, rewards still need to be stored up to trial t, but Newton's method can be turned into an online algorithm using the well-known Robbins-Monro method [53] . We simply replace the gradient with an (stochastic) approximation that depends only on the current trial:
Note that each side of the equation is equal in expectation when rewards are independent and 497 identically-distributed.
498
Upon replacing the gradient with a stochastic approximation, we arrive at the RW model if we use a constant learning rate λ(t) = λ 0 and the matrix
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For the Gaussian regression model, matrix H(t) resembles
evaluated atθ = μ ν We simply replaced 1 t t c(t) c(t) with the identity matrix I, which ensures H(t) is invertible. Putting the online approach together with the fact that
for the Gaussian regression model, we arrive at the following online update for the estimateθ:
Critically, estimates μ are updated exactly as in an RW model:
In other words, the RW model is an online approach to maximum likelihood estimation.
499
Latent-state learning as an online approach to expectation-maximization 500 Motivated by the previous argument, we now explore how one could perform MLE online to predict rewards with latent-states. A natural choice for modeling rewards is to use a Markov chain of Gaussian regression models. Latent random variable X(t) ∈ {1, . . . , L} represents the active hypothesis on trial t. Given the active hypothesis X(t) = l, rewards are described by a Gaussian linear regression model:
where µ 1 , . . . , µ L are unknown parameters and (t) is an independent Gaussian random variable with mean 501 zero and unknown variance ν. The extension to latent-state learning thus leads to L different Gaussian 502 regression models for rewards rather than one. As discussed in the Model subsection, we assume X(t) is a 503 Markov chain that transitions to itself from one trial to the next with probability 1 − γ(L − 1)/L and initial probabilities for X(0) are assumed to be known/given, leaving unknown parameters collected in 506 θ = µ 1 · · · µ L ν .
507
In a latent-variable setting, a popular algorithm to perform MLE is expectation-maximization (EM) [54] .
An iterative algorithm, EM improves upon a current estimateθ at each iteration in two steps. Fixing the current trial number t, an expectation step uses a current estimateθ to calculate the expectation of the complete log-likelihood of rewards and latent states given rewards and scaled by 1/t:
E log f R(s) X(s), θ + log P X(s) X(s − 1) R(1:t),θ A maximization step searches for a maximum of Q(θ|θ) over θ. The maximum is then used as the estimate in 508 the next iteration. The crux of the EM method is that Q(θ|θ) is easier to maximize than the log-likelihood 509 (θ) of the observed data and that improvement in Q(θ|θ) guarantees improvement in (θ).
510
Mirroring our argument for the Rescorla-Wagner model, we can replace the maximization step with a Newton update:θ − λ(t)H(t) −1 ∇ θ Q(θ|θ) θ=θ for appropriate learning rate λ(t) and matrix H(t). Even in a latent-variable setting, one choice for H(t) is still the negative of the Fisher's information matrix scaled be 1/t and evaluated atθ, but Newton's method still requires all rewards up to trial t. To recover an online approach, we use a stochastic approximation to ∇ θ Q(θ|θ(t)) in the maximization step:
∇ θ Q(θ|θ(t)) ≈ ∇ θ E log f R(t) X(t), θ + log P X(t) X(t − 1) R(1:t),θ = L l=1 P X(t) = l|R(1:t),θ ∇ θ log f R(t) X(t) = l, θ
We then replace P X(t) = l|R(1:t),θ , which is computed using all the rewards, with latent-state beliefs 34/41 p l (t) defined at Eq. 5 which is computed online. This replacement yields the stochastic approximation ∇ θ Q(θ|θ(t)) ≈ L l=1 p l (t)∇ θ log f R(s) X(s) = l, θ
The last equality follows from our assumption that rewards are a Markov chain of Gaussian regression models. 511
Upon replacing the gradient in Newton's method with this stochastic approximation, we can arrive at our latent-state learning model if we use λ(t) = α 0 and matrix
where we used the definition of B l (t) at Eq. 4. For a Markov chain of Gaussian regression models, matrix H(t) resembles the negative of the Fisher information matrix scaled by 1/t: 
We thus arrive at our latent-state model for updating associative strengths at Eq.(1). We can also recover 512
our latent-state model for updating variance at Eq (7), if we replace the learning rate α 0 with a different 513 learning rate β 0 . This completes our motivation for our latent-state model.
514
Supporting information 515 S1 Text. Additional support and details. This supplement is divided into four sections: Extensions, 516
Comparison to other learning models, Simulation details, and Sensitivity of predictions to parameters. The 517
first section discusses how to extend the latent-state model to allow for multidimensional rewards and 
